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ABSTRACT: Within the purview of economics, there are a number of phenomena that remain

unexplained. One such phenomenon is the existence of inter-industry wage differentials;
differences in wages paid to observationally equivalent workers. This paper investigates
the link between the degree of international competition in an industry and the premium
paid to workers in that industry. The rationale for this connection lies in the hypothesis
that the source of the observed wage premium arises from the sharing of rents with workers
in profitable industries. International competition serves to reduce the market power of
firms in the industry reducing the existence of rents, in turn, reducing the wage premium.
It is in this sense that barriers to trade might result in a wage differential that would not
otherwise exist.
Preliminary findings are that international competition does have a significant impact on both industry profitability and inter-industry wages. Further, the results indicate
that the changes in competitiveness during the early 1980s altered industry wages differentials so as to reduce observed earnings inequality.
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I. Introd uction
The origins of most modern studies of international trade and wages, both theoretical and empirical, can be traced to the pioneering work of Stolper and Samuelson
(1941). This piece was the first to substantially tie down the general equilibrium relationship between changes in the international environment and relative factor incomes. In
the subsequent fifty years, substantial effort has been devoted to generalizing this work
theoretically and examining its validity empirically.
In recent years, awareness of the importance of international trade linkages with
domestic wage determination has grown substantially. With increasing regularity, labor
economists have begun including some measure of international trade in studies of wage
determination. Deardorff and Hakura (1993) presents an excellent survey of this literature;
including a very helpful discussion of the sizeable gap between the set of questions that
can be appropriately asked and questions that are in fact asked.
The primary focus of the work to date has been on the general equilibrium effects
of international trade on wage determination. Substantially absent from the literature is
an analysis of partial equilibrium wage determination. \Vhile the perfectly competitive
labor markets assumption standard in most of labor economics would indeed lead one
to question such an analysis, much more than casual empiricism reveals its importance.
The existence of wage differences for observationally equivalent workers across industries,
commonly referred to as inter-industry wage differentials, is well documented, and is largely
held as one of the least understood aspects of the employment relationship. Accounting
for 15% of observed wage inequality, its importance should not be underestimated.
Accordingly, this study provides further evidence into the sources of these wage
differentials. Specifically, the influence of international trade is investigated. Recent studies
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by Dickens and Lang (1987) and Katz and Summers (1989) have noted specific correlations
between the extent of trade activity in an industry and wage differentials. Theirfinding is
that imports tend to be more prevalent in industries with low-wage premia while industries
paying larger wage premia tend to export more. Neither study, however, investigates the
relationship thoroughly. Gaston and Trefler (1991) provide an interesting analysis of the
relationship, including comprehensive measures of industry protection. Absent from this
study, however, is consideration of alternative sources of these wage differentials. The
effects of international trade are thus assessed in the absence of controls for these other
relationships. While these studies highlight a correlation, a causal link has yet to be
established.
The objectives of this study are two-fold. The primary objective is to assess the
relationship that exists between changes in international competition and the industrial
structure of wages in the United States; i.e., the pattern of wage differences across industries. The sources of these differentials are fundamentally determined within the industry
while not substantially influencing other sectors of the economy; hence, the analysis can
be undertaken in a partial equilibrium framework. The secondary objective is to relate the
changes in industry differentials arising from changing trade patterns with changes in the
observed distribution of earnings. Recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in
the earnings of skilled workers vis a vis those of unskilled workers. The expectation is that
changes in international competition have served to exacerbate this trend through their
influence on wage differentials.
It is primarily manufacturing industries that exhibit significant wage premia and

workers in manufacturing sectors tend to be unskilled. Increases in international competition that serve to reduce the wage premia in manufacturing serve to reduce the earnings
of low-skilled workers in two ways. First, because the rents of domestic firms are lowered
as international competition increases, the wages of workers remaining in those industries
decline. Second, to the extent that foreign competition leads to lower employment lev-
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els in these concentrated industries, many of the workers must move to the lower paying
competitive sectors of the economy. Overall, the wages of less educated workers will fall
relative to those of college educated workers. l It is only the first of these influences that
is addressed in this study, however.
The study is based on the following presumptions; first, that of a link between
international competitiveness and industry profitability. This is an assumption that is
largely consistent with predictions of the "new" trade theory, and one that has been,
to some degree, empirically verified. 2 The second assumption is that of a relationship
between industry profitability and industry wages. This connection is less well documented;
previous research has, for reasons discussed below, focused on industry concentration rather
than profitability and the results of these studies are mixed; earlier research found no
significant connection between concentration and wages, while later studies report small
but statistically significant positive effects. 3
There is reason to believe that studies of the influence of import competition on
observed industry profitability will generate results that are biased downward. The reasoning lies in the distinction between the observed profitability of an industry and the
actual or potential profitability of an industry. Observed profitability, measured as the

price-cost margin, can differ from actual profitability through the existence of "monopoly
rent-sharing" in the industry. To the extent that import competition results in a reduction of rents paid to labor, rather than a reduction in observed profitability, the effects of
international competition will be understated;
There is further reason to believe that studies measuring the impact of concentration on wages will mis-state the relationship when ignoring the role played by international
competition. It is possible that domestic concentration of production could increase in the
face of foreign competition while actual industry profitability declines.

Such an effect

1 Borjas and Ramey (1992) present a partial analysis and empirical test of this h,ypothesis.
2 See Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1976), who find that foreign factors represent a fruitful addition to conventional
domestic structure variables in explaining inter-industry differences in price-cost margins. See also Pugel (1980)
and Nolle (1991).
3 Weiss(1966), Belman(1988), and Kwoka(1983)
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would serve to weaken the link between industry concentration and observed differences
in industry wages.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents a brief discussion of alternative
sources of inter-industry wage differentials. The methodology employed in this study is
presented in Section III, while results are found in Section IV and general conclusions are
discussed in Section V.

II. Inter-Industry Wage Differentials
Inter-industry wage differentials are differences in wages paid to observationally
equivalent workers in different industries. The existence of these industry differences is
well documented. 4

The explanations for these industry differences however are rougWy

as large in number as are the studies documenting their existence. These explanations
can be substantially covered by identifying three broad categories: compensating wage
differentials, the payment of efficiency wages, and rent-sharing. 5 Compensating wage differentials are differences in wages that arise because of some basic difference in the work
environment within one industry relative to all other industries. Efficiency wage theories
center around the idea that increasing workers wages above the market rate will have a
positive influence on profits, possibly through reducing the incidence of turnover, raising
the effort of workers, or by increasing the quality of the applicant pool. Finally, managers
may find it in their best interest to allocate some share of the rents to providers of factor
inputs.
The first and second explanations have been largely discredited as primary determinants of inter-industry wage differentials. Krueger and Summers, using the Michigan
Quality of Employment Survey, find limited evidence of compensating wage differentials.
4 Krueger and Summers (1988) provide a detailed econometric accounting and test of various reasons for their
existence. Other authors have also documented their existence and sta.bility over time, for example, Slichter
(1950).
5 It has also been suggested that unobserved qua.lity differences might account for some part of the differentials.
Krueger and Summers present compelling evidence that this is not the case.

5

June 1995

Capelli and Chauvin (1991) find that the payment of efficiency wages would imply the expenditure of roughly $2 million/year, or $121,000 per shirking-related disciplinary action,
at a representative firm with 1000 workers, to explain the measured differentials. This
would seem an implausibly expensive means of reducing shirking.

It is the last of these explanations that forms the basis for this study. The rentsharing or "monopoly-wage hypothesis" is the idea that workers in concentrated industries
secure higher wages as a result of the larger profits to be shared or the greater ability
of firms to pass oncost increases to consumers. The sharing of rents with workers in
the industry can be explained as a way of encouraging worker loyalty. This is but one
explanation, one that might be listed under the efficiency wage theories.

Alternative

explanations of rent-sharing might include paying higher wages in an effort to maintain
a good public image,6 or that firms may possess a limit-profitability, that is, a level of
observed profits above which potential entrants may realize their potential and enter the
market. Incumbent firms will then use any excess profits to improve the lot of their workers
and other producers/suppliers 'of factors of production.

III. Methodology
The primary motivation of this study is to assess the impact of trade driven changes
in inter-industry wage differentials on the earnings distribution. The analysis will be carried
out in a three stage process. The first stage consists of generating a time series of crosssectional data on inter-industry wage differentials. In the second stage, the source of the
inter-industry wage differentials will be investigated. There exists an extensive literature
that has determined the industry characteristics that are likely sources of wage differentials;
these include plant size, industry concentration, and unionization rates. A cross-product
term between concentration and unionization has also been found to be important for
disentangling the related effects of unionization and concentration (Kwoka (1983)). In
6

See Weiss

(1966)

for an elaboration of this hypothesis.

~
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addition, this study adds data on trade volumes: import penetration ratios and exports
as a share of domestic production.
The third step is then to examine the impact of observed changes in trading patterns on the distribution of earnings. This consists of calculating the difference between
the observed wage premia and those that would have prevailed in the absence of changes in
trade competition. The change in wage premia will then be correlated with the distribution
and type of workers in each industry.

Wage Differentials
The approa.ch taken here is to focus on the differences in compensation between
industries, rather than on the level of compensation in different industries. These differentials are calculated as the coefficients on industry dummies in the following standard wage
equation:

i=l, ... ,nj,
Where

Xij

is a vector of individual specific characteristics and

Dj

j=l, ... ,I.

(1)

is an industry dummy

variable. The OJ are then the payments to workers in industry j above those due to their
individual-specific characteristics. The wage and other individual specific data is from a
time series of March Current Population Survey computer tapes spanning 1979 through
1985. The classification of industries is according to the three digit Census Industry Classification (CIC) scheme. 7,8 As alluded to above, we are measuring industry compensation
rather than wages alone. That is. the wage recorded in the CPS is inflated so as to reflect
total expenditures on labor, rather than payroll, as reported in the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. What is truly being investigated are, therefore, inter-industry compensation
differentials.
7 This classification corresponds to a combination of 2- and 3- digit Standard Industrial Codes.
8 A more thorough presentation of the methodology is contained in a data appendix available from the author.
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Sources of Compensation Differentials

The framework in which to think about these compensation differences is as follows.
In any given industry, j, the workers receive a fraction of industry rents. Compensation is
then determined as follows:
Wji

= Wi . (1

+ dj),

(2)

where i represents an individual with a given set of characteristics, and dj represents the
supra-normal rents obtained by working in industry j. In the above, Wji is observed
compensation and Wi is the market compensation for a worker with characteristics i. Expenditures on labor can then be specified as:
nj

(1

+ dj)

.

L

Wi

= aj . RENTS"

(3)

i== 1

where nj is the number of employees in industry j. In this framework, aj and RENTSj
are independently determined. 9 The rents in industry j are determined by characteristics
\

of the output market, while the share of these rents going to labor, aj, are determined
internally to the firm. The remaining rents are allocated across other expenditure categories. These categories include producers of capital and other inputs, shareholders, and
other expenditure categories not related to the production process, such as research and
development (R&D) or advertising.
Rearranging (3) we find that
r)
aj . RENTSj
(l+uj =
"
LJa Wi

Taking logarithms of the latter and utilizing the fact that, for small dj, In(l

+ dj)

~

dj ,

we have·

where
9 It need not be the case that OJ and RENTSj are independent. If managers wish to provide their shareholders
with a particular rate of return, it is possible that labor's share of rents could decline with rents.
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= ,Zl + tl

In(aj)

and
In(RENTSj)

= pZz + t2.

Zl and Zz are then vectors of industry characteristics determining the fraction of rents
accruing to labor and the volume of rents available, respectively. The estimating equation
is then of the following form:

6j,t = (3 + ,Zl,t + pZZ,t + T),
where

+ €2

and is assumed to be distributed normally, with mean zero. The

T)j,t

are, however, heteroskedastic. The heteroskedasticity arises from the fact that the

6j,t

T)

=

€1

are coefficients from the first stage regression and are estimated with a particular error
variance. The Generalized Least Squares method, w~ighting each observation by 1/(j,
where

(j

is the standard error of the estimated

J from equation (1), is used to estimate the

above relationship.

Counterfact ual
The counterfactual analysis of this study involves the calculation of the wage differentials had there been no change in trading patterns over the time period, that is, had
trade not changed in level of importance for the domestic industry. Crucial to the analysis is the conceptual development of values for the trade variables that represent neutral
changes in trading patterns. Import penetration ratios and exports as a fraction of domestic production were used to indicate the level and nature of international competition
in each industry. Consequently, it is necessary to specify what it means to maintain the
1978 level of importance of international trade throughout the time period.
With respect to the trade variables, had we been using simple exports and imports,
this would be a difficult issue. Problems concerning the rate of growth of the domestic
market would complicate matters. Given the variables used, however, simply fitting values
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of the wage differentials given zeto values for the difference in import penetration and
export share variables accomplishes this.

IV. Regression Results
This section launches the investigation into the sources of inter-industry wage differentials. As a rough test of the data, and in order to develop some insight into the results
obtained in the inter-industry wage differential regressions, Column 1 of Table 1 presents
results from a now standard industry profitability regression. Overall, the results presented
here conform very well with previously published studies.

Industry concentration, cap-

ital, advertising, and R&D expenditures each exert a positive influence on profitability,
while a higher degree of unionization is found to reduce profitability.
Column 2, however, utili,zes an alternative definition of industry profitability as
the dependent variable. The traditional measure first presented by Collins and Preston
(1969), is calculated as:

Rents

=

ValueAd~ed - Payroll.
Shzpments

Under the operative rent-sharing hypothesis, this presents a potentially dramatic misspecification of industry rents. This measure has the undesirable property of attributing
rents shared with labor to costs, biasing measured industry rents downward.
The alternative definition of industry rent attributes the fraction of compensation
that is supra-market to value added, rather than to costs. The formula is as follows:

AllRents

V 1 Add d J.payroll]
e + (l+J)
[. a ue

Payroll
(l+J)

= -=---------.:....-....:...--=----...:...----:..Shipments

This may also be a poor indicator of industry profitability; if the estimated wage premia, J,
represent efficiency wages or compensating differentials then they are properly attributable
to costs and removing them from payments to labor will cause this statistic to be biased
high. The results from Column 1 are largely robust to this alternative measure of rents.
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Table 1
Rents Regressions
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Variable

. Rents

AllRents

CONSTANT

-0.029

-0.007

(0.030)

(0.022)

-0.126**

-0.099 **

(0.060)

(0.044)

0.149*

0.194 ***

(0.078)

(0.057)

0.155***

0.157 ***

(0.046)

(0.034)

-0.128*

0.006

(0.072)

(0.052)

IPR
EPR
CR4
UNPER
ESTSZE

-0.097

0.117 **

(0.068)

U*CR4
KOUT
ADVOUT
RDOUT
R2
N
***, **, * Significantly

-0.503***

(0.049)

-0.333 ***

(0.139)

(0.102)

1.362***

1.380 ***

(0.079)

(0.057)

2.834 ***

2.254 ***

(0.206)

(0.150)

0.465

0.600 ***

(0.296)

(0.216)

0.613
392

0.690
392

different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10%.

Several findings are worthy of note at this point. First, the coefficients on the
international trade variables are precisely as one would expect.. An increase in the share
of imports in domestic sales (IPR) results in a reduction in industry profitability, whereas
an increase in the fraction of domestic production that is shipped abroad (EPR) - a
reflection of an enhanced competitive position vis a vis foreign competition - enhances
industry profitability. The effect is stronger for exports in both specifications, perhaps
reflecting what I call the large market syndrome: US exporters, given the large size of
their primary market, appear to be less likely to search out additional markets than are
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foreign producers. Hence, the extent to which they do is reflective of their participation
in only the most profitable markets.
The coefficient on the percent unionized variable (UNPER) provides some insight
into the rent-sharing hypothesis. When some fraction of labor compensation is included in
rents rather than costs, the percent unionized variable is no longer significant. One might
be tempted, to accept this as evidence of the super-efficiency of unions, that is, unions
have no impact on rents, merely on their distribution. This notion is quickly dispelled
when one notices the coefficient on the cross-product term between union activity and
concentration (CR4). Unionization does seem to lower the level of profitability of more
concentrated industries. The average establishment size (ESTSZE) enters the regression
in column 1 with an unexpected negative sign. This result is reversed, however, when rents
are accurately measured, supporting the notion that larger firms tend to be more efficient
than smaller firms.
We turn now to estimating the source of the industry wage differentials. The
regression specification consists of two sets of variables, Zl and Z2, those determining
labor's share of overall rents and the available rents, respectively. Studies identifying Zz are
plentiful. Unfortunately, constructing a time series of these variables on a disaggregated
level is very difficult. Hence, we will only use a subset of those variables identified as
influencing industry profitability.lo To my knowledge, the variables appropriately included
in Zl have not been previously specified. The estimated regression will'include in Zl
variables reflective of the categories across which any rents might be distributed.
The set of variables Zl include K/L, the ratio of capital expenditures to labor expenditures. If managers are distributing rents across capital and labor, then the lower are
expenditures on capital relative to labor, the higher will be labors share of industry rents.
The percent unionized, UNPER and U*CR4, also belong in Zl. A larger union presence
should bias the distribution of rents towa.rds labor. Finally, the ratios of advertising and
10 These are the variables in Table 1.
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research and development (R&D) to output, ADVOUT and RDOUT, are also expected to
influence labors share of the rents. That is, managers already making significant expenditures on advertising and R&D may be inclined to increase those expenditures, reducing
labors share.
The sets of explanatory variables, Zl and Z2, turn out to overlap. The percent
unionized, for instance, is a member of both groups, as are

~xpenditureson

advertising and

R&D. Interpretation of the estimated coefficients will therefore be difficult. The magnitude
of the coefficients will not be meaningful, however, the sign will provide some insight into
the relative strengths of the separate influences should they push in opposite directions;
advertising and R&D. for example, are indicative of larger overall rents, but are expected
to reduce labor's share of those rents. If their respective coefficients are negative, this can·
be interpreted as their having a more significant impact on OJ than on RENTSj.
The issue of specific interest is the influence of changing trade patterns on the
partial equilibrium wage premia received by workers in particular industries. These trade
variables are not thought to exert influence over labor's share of rents, but rather over the
availability of rents. 11
Table 2 presents the results of regressions attempting to explain the determinants
of inter-industry wage differentials (IIWD). Two alternative specifications are presented.
Columns 1 and 2 include a single intercept term, while columns 3· and 4 control for industry
fixed effects by including separate dummy variables for each of the 56 industries. The fixed
effects model is estimated as an attempt to control for hypotheses competing with rentsharing. Specifically, the incidence of compensating wage differentials and efficiency wage
payments are likely to differ systematically, cross industries.· The time period is short
enough, however, to permit the assertion of a stable inter-industry relationship.
A striking feature of the results is their remarkable stability across specifications.
Given that some of the explanatory variables are likely to be indicators of efficiency wages
11 Although the automobile industry provides a glaring counterexample, this event is not representative of the
general relationship between labor and management.
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Table 2
Regression Coefficients - IIWD
With Ind llstry Fixed Effects
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Common Intercept

CONSTANT

-0.099 ***
(0.032)

Ind. Fixed Effects

-0.131 ***
(0.090)

Variables Determining the Level of Profits (Z2)

IPR

-0.295 ***

EPR

-0.089

(0.059)

(0.094)

0.531 ***

0.446 ***

0.514 ***

0.202

(0.085)

(0.140)

(0.095)

(0.151)

-1.033 ***

EPR*CR4

-0.917 ***

(0.238)

(0.266)

0.179

0.814 **

(0.300)

(0.341)

-0.168 ***

-0.145 ***

-0.078

0.030

(0.050)

(0.063)

0.532 ***

0.495 ***

0.588 ***

0.569 ***

(0.076)

(0.075)

(0.087)

(0.085)

-0.044

-0.041

-0.032

-0.014

(0.127)

(0.114)

(0.105)

(0.105)

ESTSZE
KOUT

-0.348 ***

(0.090)

IPR*CR4

CR4

0.019

(0.056)

. (0.045)

(0.051)

Variables determining Labor's Share of Profits (ZI)

K/L

-0.048 ***

UNPER

-0.049 ***

-0.059 ***

-0.065 ***

(0.011 )

(0.011 )

(0.014)

(0.014)

0.244 ***

0.276 ***

0.050

0.065

(0.081 )

(0.080)

(0.063)

(0.065)

0.346 **

0.292 *

0.616 ***

0.597 ***

(0.157)

(0.154)

(0.150)

(0.149)

Variables in Both ZI and Z2

U*CR4
ADVOUT

-0.340
(0.259)

RDOUT
R2
N

***, .., * Significantly

-1.053 ***

-0.704 ***
(0.267)

-0.686 ***

-0.511 *
(0.265)

-1.222 ***

-0.767 ***
(0.287)

-0.982 ***

(0.220)

(0.237)

(0.236)

(0.263)

0.659

0.675
392

0.710
392

0.722
392

392

different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10%.

or compensating differentials, one might expect their coefficients to decline significantly in
absolute size when the industry dummies are included. In particular, it could reasonably be
suggested that a larger establishment size, or a higher capital-labor ratio, might plausibly

14

June 1995

result in efficiency wage differentials, or that the latter might result in positive compensating differentials. Most of the "estimated coefficients are nonetheless very robust across
specifications. Curiously, however, the percent unionized becomes unimportant when the
industry dummies are included. Further investigation reveals that the individual industry
unionization rates do not fluctuate significantly during this period and are hence highly
correlated with the industry dummies.
The results do tend to support the rent-sharing hypothesis. Higher expenditures on
capital (relative to labor), advertising, and R&D all tend to reduce labor income. Industry
concentration (CR4) is curiously negative. However, the cross-product between CR4 and
the percent unionized is positive and significant, suggesting that organized labor's ability
to raise wages is indeed correlated with industry concentration.
Whether or not industry fixed effects are included, a significant ability of international trade to influence labor's income is indicated. Focusing on the fixed effects model, it
is apparent that a larger presence of foreign supply in the domestic market reduces labor
income, while an expansion of exports provides an even greater boost to labor. As a further
check of the rent-sharing hypothesis, column 4 includes the trade variables crossed with
the concentration ratio. Doing so reduces the significance of the raw trade variables, but
highlights the relationship with profitability. The more highly concentrated is the industry,
the larger is the impact of international trade on labor earnings.
Although the results for the trade variables are strong statistically, their economic
significance may reasonably be questioned. The calculated elasticities for imports and
exports are between .06 and .1 in absolute value. However, the calculated elasticity for
concentration is of the same order of magnitude. To the extent that one argues concentration is important, one would argue that international trade is equally important.
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V. Wage Differentials and Inequality
Recent trends in earnings inequality include significant increases in within group
inequality. That is, the incidence of observationally equivalent workers making dramatically different wages is increasing. 12 There are several different suggestions for why this
might be so, ranging from increased variance in the quality of observed educational levels,
to changing wage-setting institutions, and increasing returns to skill. Changes in interindustry wage differentials is yet another possible explanation. The evidence regarding
inter-industry wage differentials and inequality is quite lean, however. Blackburn (1990),
also using CPS data, shows that approximately 15 percent of the increase in within-group
variation in earned income for men results from the movement of workers from industries
in which the residual variation in earned income is relatively low to industries in which.
the residual variation is relatively high. Dickens and Katz (1987) provide further evidence
that industry-specific differentials explain approximately 15 percent of residual earnings
variation in a cross-section.
Table 3 provides an indication of the role played by wage differentials in generating
inequality within the sample used here. The data in the columns labelled "Actual" and
"No ~ Trade" are based on the observed wage differentials and the counterfactual differentials, respeCtively. In other words, the "Actual" column is how the world is, while the "No
~ Trade"

column is how the world would have been, but for the changes in international

competition experienced throughout the period. The first row indicates the extent of variation in wage differentials within an industry over time and is an average across industries.
The second row indicates the variation across industries and is an average over time. Not
surprisingly, the average within industry variation is significantly smaller than the across
industry. variation. It is this latter variation that is specifically under
investigation. We
I
also find that the variation within manufacturing industries is lower than for the economy
as a whole.
12 See Levy and Murnane (1992) for an excellent review of this literature.
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Table 3
Standard Deviations of Wage Differentials

All Industries

Manufacturing

Actual

No.6.Trade

Actual

No .6.Trade

Within Industries

.091

.098

.085

.099

Across Industries

.200

.206

.155

.174

From this table, evidence of the influence of changing trade patterns on inequality
is apparent. The second and fourth columns indicate the degree of variance in all industries
and manufacturing, respectively. Looking first at manufacturing industries, we find striking
results both in terms of t.he magnitude of change and the direction. What we learn is that
both within and across industry variation in wages are approximately 10% lower than they
would have been in the absence of changing international competition. The same tendency
holds for all industries, but the effect is smaller.
In terms of the a priori intuition, these results are counterintuitive. If one stops to
consider the time period, however, the results are not so surprising. During this period,
imports increased dramatically, with no corresponding increase in exports. In fact, while
.the mean import penetration ratio increased from 8.2% to 11.9%, production for export
fell from 9.2% to 7.1%. The net result is a decline in the premia paid in 42 of the 56
industries. With manufacturing industries generally paying the largest premia, the result
is reduced overall variation in the observed differentials.
As for earnings inequality more generally, Table 4 presents annual Gini coefficients
for all industries in columns 2 and 3 and for the manufacturing sector alone in columns
4 and 5. Again, a counterfactual level of inequality is juxtaposed the observed level of
inequality. The "Actual" and "No .6.Trade" columns are analogous to those in Table
3.

The Actual· Gini coefficients are based on the micro-data from which the 8s were.
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Table 4
Gini Coefficients

All Industries
Year

Actual

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

0.323
0.324
0.320
0.322·
0.329
0.337
0.334
0.338

No

~Trade

0.323
0.325
0.321
0.323
0.330
0.336
0.333
0.338

Manufacturing
Actual
0.291
0.285
0.277
0.283
0.290
0.299
0.298
0.304

No

~Trade

0.291
0.286
0.278
0.285
0.293
0.302
0.305
0.312

estimated. The No 6.Trade gini'::; are calculated by altering the micro-data in such a
way as to account for the accumulated effects of changing international trade patterns.
That is, the 1978 No 6. Trade Gini is equal to the Actual 1978 Gini, while the 1979 No
6. Trade Gini is equal to the Actual 1979 Gini plus the industry by industry changes in

fitted inter-industry wage differentials imposing neutral international competition. The
No

~ Trade

gini's for subsequent years are calculated analogously, imposing the 1978 level

of international competition. The differences between column 2 and 3 and the differences
between columns 4 and 5 in i985, therefore, represent the accumulated effect of changing
trade patterns.
Once again, we find that over time, changing trade patterns have served to ,reduce
earnings inequality. In manufacturing industries, international forces reduce the Gini coefficient by three percent. \Vhile this might seem a rather small change, the overall impact
on the Gini coefficient of removing the wage differentials entirely is to reduce inequality
by approximately eight percent. International trade then served to reduce the earnings
inequality stemming from wage differential by nearly one half.
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Table 5
Wage Changes

% Change Due to:

Hourly Compensation
Observed

No .6.Trade

% Change

Imports

Exports

By Occupation:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

8.08
11.10
8.97
9.43
11.56
13.08
10.31
14.96
19.02
16.61

8.12
11.31
9.17
9.62
11.81
13.35
10.54
15.28
19.42
17.09

-0.53
-2.04
-2.32
-2.41
-2.11
-2.05
-2.20
-1.80
-2.17
-2.77

-0.05
-1.27
-1.66
-1.82
-1.69
-1.22
-1.27
-0.97
-1.11
-0.86

-0.49
-0.77
-0.66
-0.59
-0.42
-0.83
-0.94
-0.83
-1.07
-1.91

9.18
11.62
13.09
19.19

-2.39
-2.15
-2.26
-2.52

-1.83
-1.42
-1.11
-1.03

-0.57
-0.73
-1.15
-1.50

By Education Level:

< 12 Years
High School
Some College
College Grad

9.13
11.52
12.93
18.91

The influence on the economy as a whole is much less significant.

While the

tendency was to reduce inequality throughout the period, the Gini coefficient controlling
for changes in trade patterns ends up roughly equal to the observed Gini coefficient in

1985, just as it was assumed to in 1978. Given that the manufacturing sector accounted
for only 25% of employment during this period, this significant difference is not entirely
surprising.
The effect on manufacturing is, however, surprising and warrants further investigation. Table 5 thus presents the impact of changing trade patterns on the wages of
variously skilled workers. Column 1 contains the observed level of hourly compensation in

1985, while the second column presents the levels of compensation that would have been
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paid but for the change in international competitiveness. Columns 3 through 5 display the.
overall percent change in wages, the change due to fluctuations in import competitiveness,
and due to export competitiveness, respectively.
The upper portion of Table 5 presents the -impact on wages by occupation. The
occupations are ordered by increasing educational demand. That is, the average worker in
occupation 10 (professional, technical and kindred workers) has obtained more schooling
that the average worker in occupation 1 (farming, forestry, and fishing occupations). From
these occupational statistics, it becomes clear that the impact across skill levels is rougWy
uniform. Breaking it out into the impact of imports and exports separately, it appears as
though imports have a more substantial impact on lower skill occupations while exports
tend to impact the more skilled workers.
The lower portion of Table 5 illustra.tes this pattern of influence with more clarity.
The impact of changes in imports declines monotonically with education, while the impact
of changes in export competition is monotonically increasing with skill level. Although the
influence on overall inequality is surprising, the underlying influence on wages very much
conforms to our a priori expectations. That is, as import competing industries go, so go
the fortunes of the unskilled; as the export competing industries go, so go the fortunes of
the skilled.

VI. Conclusions
The primary contribution of this research is to provide a new approach to an old
problem. Using changes in international competitiveness removes a bias inherent in the
prior analyses of the relationship between industry profitability and wages, that of the
immeasurability of actual or potential industry profits.
Additionally, the individual level data used in the construction of the dependent
variable permits an analysis of one avenue through which trade has an impact on the
earnings distribution in the United States. If there is a systematic bias in the type of
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worker, perhaps skilled versus low-skilled, that receive the wage premia, then, to the extent
that import competition serves to reduce inter-industry wage differentials, it will also serve
to reduce the earnings of those receiving a wage premium relative to those that do not. A

priori, one might expect that it is low skilled workers that receive the wage premia and
hence that trade will serve to exacerbate the disparity of earnings in the United States.

Ex post, however, what we find is that changes in trade patterns in the early
1980s altered industry wages differentials so as to reduce observed earnings inequality.
The sizeable trade imbalance developed at the beginning of the decade resulted in many

industries being subject to substantial increases in competition from abroad. The end
result appears to have been a depressing of wages in the manufacturing sectors. Given
that manufacturing sectors pay above average wages, the result was

a: compression of the

earnings distribution.

It should be noted, however, that this result pertains to but one avenue through
which international competitiveness can influence the earnings distribution. There is noth-

ing in the analysis that addresses intersectoral employment flows due to international trade
and hence there is no attempt to address Stolper-Samuelson type general equilibrium wage
effects. The conclusion of this study, then, is that in a period of increasing within group
inequality, changes in international competitiveness appear to have reduced within group
inequality relative to what would have otherwise been observed.
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APPENDIX A

. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Table A.I
Description of Variables
Variable

RENTS
ALLRENTS
IPR
EPR
CR4
IPR*CR4
EPR*CR4
UNPER
U*CR4
ESTSZE
KIL

KOUT
ADVOUT
RDOUT

Mean*

Description

0.249

Industry rents as per Collins and Preston (1969).

0.358

0.437

Industry rents labelling wage differentials as rents.
. Ra .
Imports
I mport PenetratJOn
tJO: DomesticSales'
Exports
Export share of domestic production: DomesticProduction'
4-firm Concentration ratio.

0.037

Crossproduct of IPR and CR4.

0.037

Crossproduct of EPR and CR4.

0.301

Percent of industry labor force covered by a union contract.

0.135

Crossproduct of UNPER and CR4.

0.105

Average industry establishment size.

0.094
0.086

0.997

Capital expenditures relative to payroll.

0.191

Capital expenditures as a fraction of industry sales.

0.021

Advertising expenditures as a fraction of industry sales.

0.016

R&D expenditures as a fraction of industry sales.

*Means are for manufacturing industries during the years 1979 through 1985.
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APPENDIX B

DATA

The data on wages and individual worker characteristics are from a time series of
March Current Population Survey (CPS) data tapes spanning 1979 through 1985. The
sample of observations is limited to those individuals in the outgoing rotation group.13
While this reduces the size of the sampIe in each year, it also eliminates an explicit source of
temporal correlation in the calculated wage differentials. That is, an individual observation
is only included in the calculation of one years wage differential.
In addition to the 55 industry dummies (plus the omitted industry gives 56) the
control variables included in the wage regression are the following: 8 region and 9 occupation dummy variables, education, marital status, race, age, sex, central city dummy,
and the following cross-product terms: education-sex, education 2-sex, age-sex, marital
status-sex.
The international trade, production, unionization, and employment data are from
the NBER Trade dataset, the NBER Productivity Database, and the NBER Manufacturing
Sector Master File. These data come in the 4 digit SIC classification and are subsequently
concorded to a slightly aggregated version of the Census Industry Classification used in
the CPS datasets. Limiting our observations to manufacturing industries, we have data
for a total of 56 traded industries over a seven year time series.
The following table provides further information regarding the data sources.

13

Individuals in the CPS sample are interviewed for eight months; each household is interviewed for four consecutive months (the incoming rotation) and then falls out of the rotation for eight months and then is interviewed in
each of four more consecutive months (the outgoing rotation). The consequence of this is that some individuals
will be present in both the year t March CPS and the year t + 1 CPS.

B.1

B.2
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Table"B.!

Data Sources
Variable

Description

Capital

(ASM) real capital stock (plant+equipment).

Union

Percent of all workers unionized. 1974 values estimated
from 1973,74,75 May CPS; 1958-73 values also contain this
estimate. 1980 values estimated from 79,80,81 May CPS;
1983, 84 and 85 values are from Hirsch and MacPherson
(1993). Estimates for intervening years obtained by interpolating linearly.

Payroll

(ASM) annual payroll.

Output

(ASM) value of industry shipments.

Imports
Exports

Import and export data for 1972-85 from the BLS trade
monitoring system. Data for 1958-71 obtained by using the
BLS method for import/export classification and adjusting
shipment data. Raw data for this period from Census Bureau publication, "US Commodity Exports and Imports as
Related to Output."

Estsze

(CM) average employment per establishment.

Vadd

(ASM) value added by manufacture (equals shipments materials + inventory change).

CR4

4-firm Concentration ratio. Calculated using data from
the NBER Productivity Database as described in Hall
(1990). The index is calculated by dividing the output of
the largest four firms in this database by the above output
variable for each industry and year.

Advertising

Advertising expenditures as a fraction of industry sales.
Where industry sales is defined as sales from firms present
in Hall (1990).

R&D

R&D expenditures as a fraction of industry sales. Where
industry sales is defined as sales from firms present in Hall
(1990).

.

ASM: Annual Survey of Manufactures. CM: Census of Manufactures.

APPENDIX C
INDUSTRY DEFINITIONS
Number
1
2
:3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22

23

24
25
26
27
28

29
30
31
32
33

34
35
36

37
38
39

40
41

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54
55
56

Description
Meat products
Dairy products
Canned, frozen and preserved fruits and vetgetables
Grain mill products
.
Bakery products
Beverage industry
Sugar confectionery products
Food industries n.e.c.
Tobacco manufactures
Knitting mills
Dyeing and finishing textiles, except wool and knit goods
Yarn, thread, and Misc. textile mill products
Apparel and access., except knit
Misc. fabricated textile products
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills
Misc. paper and pulp products
Newspaper publishing and printing
Printing, publishing, and allied industries, ex. newspapers
Plastics, synthetics, resins and chemicals
Drugs
Soaps and cosmetics
Misc. Chemicals and Allied· Products.
Petroleum refining and Misc. petroleum and coal products
Tires, plastic footwear, belting, and other rubber products
Misc. plastic products
Leather and Leather products
Logging
Sawmills, planing mills, and millwork
Wood buildings and mobile homes and Misc. wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products
Balst furnaces, steelworks, finish mills
Iron and steel foundries
Primary aluminum industries
Other primary metal industries
Cutlery, handtools, and general hardware
Fabricated structural metal products
Misc. fabricated metal products
Metal forgings, stampings and Ordnance
Engines and turbines
Farm machinery and equipment
Construction and material handling machines
Metalworking machinery
Computers and related equipment
Machinery, exc. electrical, n.e.c.
Household appliances
Radio, TV, and communication equipment
Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies n.e.c.
Motor vehicles and equipment
Aircraft and parts
Railroad, Ship and boat building and reparing
Cycles and misc. transportation equipment
Scientific and controlling instruments
Medical, dental, and optical instruments and supplies
Photographicand timekeeping equipment and supplies
Manufacturing industries n.e.c.

C.l

APPENDIX D

OCCUPATIONS

Table D.l
Occupation Codes·
(Ordered by educational requirement - lowest to highest)
Number

Description

1

Farming, Forestry, and Fishing Occupations

2
3

Service occupations

4

Machine Operators, Assemblers, and Inspectors
Transportation and Material Moving Equipment Occupations

5
6
7
8
9
10

Nonfarm laborers

Precision production, craft, and repair occupations
Administrative support occupations, Including Clerical
Sales workers
Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations
Professional, technical and kindred workers

D.l
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